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This article investigates the impact of associational participation of migrants on their
political integration in Berlin. Using survey data, we focus on the individual level to see
whether migrants who are active in German and/or ethnic organisations are better
integrated politically. We test the social capital argument that participation in voluntary
organisations is beneficial for political integration and investigate the empirical side of
the often normatively-based fear that ethnic self-organisation is a danger to the
integration of ethnic groups in the receiving society. We could not find a clear-cut answer
to this question. Participation in German organisations does indeed support integration,
but the effects of participation in ethnic organisations are more ambiguous: migrants
active in ethnic organisations are more politically active, but not more interested in
German politics, than migrants who are not active in ethnic organisations. Furthermore,
we conclude that the mechanisms behind the social capital argument are different for the
ethnic groups under study.
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Why Study the Political Participation of Migrants?
This article deals with the political participation of migrants in Berlin. During the
guestworker era, when migrants were seen—and often also saw themselves—as
temporary labour migrants, the socio-economic side of the integration process was
at the forefront. Now that migration has turned into permanent settlement, and
second and third generations of migrant origin are becoming increasingly visible and
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numerous, the question of migrants’ political role can no longer be avoided. From
a normative perspective, democratic philosophies, regardless of their political colour,
cannot tolerate that sizeable parts of the population are excluded from democratic
rights and do not participate in the political process. From a factual perspective,
migrants themselves have not remained passive and are an increasingly visible group
in public debates and political contention.1
Not all such migrant involvement is equally welcomed by the ‘receiving’ society,
though, and not all of it seems to contribute equally to the quality of the democratic
process. Many European countries, for instance, are confronted with sometimes
violent political activism by migrants referring to the political situation in their
countries of origin. Examples are conflicts between Kurds and Turks, between
different ex-Yugoslav ethnicities, or between Muslims and Jews. By focusing the
hearts and minds of migrants on the politics of the ‘homeland’, such migrant
activism seems to stand in the way of, rather than contribute to, the democratic
integration of migrants into the host society.
But political participation is not the only form of ethnic activism that is feared for
its possible hampering effect on the integration of ethnic minorities. Also the
emergence of ethnic communities, consisting of all kinds of institutions, organisa-
tions and shared identities, is a contested issue. On the one hand, there are
those—whom we may call ‘assimilationists’—who fear that such ethnic communities
and identities will lead to the emergence of ‘parallel societies’ or ‘ethnic ghettos’, and
to an increased fragmentation of the population. On the other hand, we find
those—whom we may call ‘multiculturalists’—who claim that migrants can only
integrate successfully into the political process on the basis of confident subcultures
with a strong sense of identity. In the multiculturalist view, political integration of
migrants is accomplished by a ‘detour’. The political integration of migrants in the
host society can only be reached when migrants become politically integrated in their
own ethnic community first.
From a non-ethnic perspective, civic engagement is nowadays seen by many
political observers—from conservative communitarians to left-wing libertarians—as
a precondition for a well-functioning democracy. Beyond the normative value of
citizens’ participation, social-scientific studies have shown that the ‘social capital’
that is produced in civil society enhances mutual trust among citizens, as well as
their trust in democratic political institutions. In his influential study on Italy,
Robert Putnam (1993) additionally showed that policy effectiveness was greater in
regions with strong civic participation and organisations. A strong civil society both
assists individual citizens to address demands via the political system, and helps
politicians to inform themselves about the needs and wants of the population,
allowing them to involve citizens’ organisations in policy formulation and im-
plementation.
In a multicultural democracy the exciting question is whether or not this positive
impact of civil society and social capital can be generalised to migrants’ political
integration. Do strong migrant organisations and subcultures also have a positive
effect on migrants’ political integration in the majority society? Or do the social
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capital produced in ethnic communities and the ensuing trust and solidarity remain
limited to the particular ethnic group and thereby become detrimental to, rather
than beneficial for, integration into the wider society? Various researchers have
suggested that maybe not all civil organisations are beneficial for democracy but only
those organisations that teach their members to trust, and cooperate with, people
from a different background—for instance people with a different ethnic origin
(Portes and Landolt 1996; Putnam 2000).
Fennema and Tillie (1999) have shown for Amsterdam that ethnic social capital
does have a beneficial effect on political integration of ethnic groups, as the ethnic
group with the highest level of participation was also the group with the most
organisations and the most dense organisational community. In this article we
analyse the political participation of ethnic groups in Berlin. As the political
participation of migrants can have an additional dimension, namely the orientation
to their or their parents’ country of origin, we asked the questions on political
participation twice. We will follow the research design of Fennema and Tillie and
investigate the influence of participation in ethnic organisations on political inte-
gration, but we do so on the individual level of analysis. We ask if, and to what
extent, levels of political participation of individual ethnic citizens can be explained
by their participation in ethnic and non-ethnic organisations.
Methodological and Technical Design of the Survey
In this article we will present part of the results of a population survey that we
conducted in November 2001 and January 2002 in collaboration with the Zentrum
fu¨r Tu¨rkeistudien. Before we present our results, we offer a short description of our
empirical fieldwork in order to make our data transparent.
A special feature of the Berlin political opportunity structure is that different
migrant groups are treated differently. We used this fact in the decision about which
groups to include in the survey. Respondents of four different ethnic groups, Turks,
Italians, Russians (among which Aussiedler and Russian Jews—henceforth presented
as one category), plus Germans as a control group, were interviewed. These four
groups differ in respect to their formal and cultural status, and therefore form
interesting comparative material in order to investigate the impact of different
policies on the integration of migrants. Aussiedler, ethnic Germans, have automatic
access to citizenship and are also seen as German in a cultural sense. Russian Jews
have no automatic access to citizenship, but they have relatively easy access to the
German nationality and are culturally seen as close to the Germans. Italians lack the
easy access to citizenship of the two former-mentioned groups, but being EU
citizens, they do have voting rights at the city district level. Furthermore, there exists
a relatively positive image of Italians, both in the political discourse and in the public
opinion (Thra¨nhardt 2000). The Turks definitely hold the worst position. German
nationality is as difficult to obtain for the Turks as for the Italians, but because
Turkey is not a member of the European Union, they also lack voting rights at the
district level, as well as the positive image that Italians profit from. Finally, the
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non-recognition and public problematisation of Islam makes the position of Turks
more difficult than that of the three other groups.
Quantitative research strategies, especially focusing on socio-economic questions,
usually refer to immigrant data that are collected as part of larger population
surveys. But such data are not always suitable, because there exist considerable
limitations due to the methods (not using mother-tongue interviewers), sampling
design (excluding migrants in possession of German nationality) and the variables
under investigation (see Galonska 2003).
The definition of a population of migrants depends to a high degree on settings.
‘Immigrants’ in the narrower sense applies only to the first generation; the term
‘aliens’ describes only a legal status, which excludes naturalised Turks or Italians; and
an ‘ethnic group’ is, following Max Weber (1964: 307), kept together by a subjective
belief in a common ancestry, which, in the case of the ‘Aussiedler’, can sometimes
refer to their German descent, sometimes to their Soviet country of origin. To get
a broad and well-defined sampling basis, we used an analogy to the Dutch official
definition, which classifies the ethnic group under study as persons who are born, or
whose parents were born in respectively Turkey, Italy or the former Soviet Union.
Unfortunately, this definition comes with a methodological problem. While in the
case of the criteria of citizenship it would be possible to draw an unbiased random
sample from the Berlin population registry, in Germany there are no official lists
available for the ethnic population defined in the way it is done here. The ‘random
route method’, often used instead of lists, is also not applicable, because it is very
inefficient to locate members of small subgroups of populations like the Italians in
Berlin. The so called ‘snowball method’ is not suitable either, because it would affect
the results of the survey in an undesirable way: individuals with a higher intensity
of personal networks have a higher probability to be designated by individuals who
are already part of the sample. Since personal networks are an important part of our
explanatory model, the snowball method is as ineligible for our purposes as the other
sampling strategies.
Instead of the methods described above, we opted for a sampling technique based
on names, which benefits from the fact that households of migrants can be identified
by specific first names, family names or parts of names. Technically this was
accomplished by a data-base query of telephone registers on CD-ROM. The advan-
tage of this method is that a sample based on names does not refer to legal status
or to subjective affiliations and that—ostensibly—there is no bias expected due to
the kind of names.2 The density of telephones in non-German households is, at 90
per cent, as high as in German households. From other research it is known that
negligible deviations regarding the availability and the willingness to participate are
related to sex, age and language abilities (Diehl and Blohm 2001; Granato 1999;
Humpert and Schneiderheinze 2000; Salentin 1999).
Taking into account the considerations sketched above, the fieldwork was under-
taken using the following design. In addition to a German comparison group,
Turkish, Italian and Russian migrants were examined, using their own or one of
their parents’ birth in the corresponding country of origin as criteria to define the
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ethnic groups. The interviews were conducted by telephone using a standardised,
bilingual questionnaire for each migrant group. The interviewers were also perfectly
bilingual. This was done in order to minimise potential biases in favour of linguis-
tically and, in close connection, culturally and politically more integrated migrants.
To prevent problems arising from sex (women may dispense with an entry in the
telephone directory due to fear of harassment) and age (older migrants tend to leave
Germany without checking out with the registry office), a quota plan was used. In
this way, 306 Germans, 317 Turks, 316 Italians and 857 Russians were interviewed.
For the purposes of this paper we select respondents from the survey by different
criteria. Firstly, in order to use only exact data we restricted the sample to cases
which have—for the variables under investigation—a maximum of one missing
value. Secondly, to make the tests of significance comparable we restrict the group
size to the extent of the smallest group. By using random samples of the larger
groups we obtained 279 cases per sample. Thirdly, beside four ‘ethnic groups’ we
drew samples of ‘national groups’, excluding migrants with German nationality.
Using the same design as described in the first and second steps, we obtained 188
exclusive nationals per sample.
The concept of national group refers to migrants who only have the citizenship of
their country of origin, and not the German nationality. Belonging to an ethnic
group is defined by being born in a foreign country or having a parent born in a
foreign country. The distinction between ethnic group and national group is made
for reasons of comparability, as data on ethnic groups are not available for every city
included in this special issue. Furthermore, the differences between the ethnic and
national groups can be interesting in themselves because they show the impact of not
possessing German nationality. In addition, we will test the significances of the
differences between the migrant groups with the ‘Mann Whitney U’ test, an ordinal
equivalent to the better-known ‘t-test’.3
The Social and Political Participation of Turks, Russians and Italians
In this section we will present the results of the survey in a descriptive way. First we
describe levels of political participation, namely political interest and engagement in
different forms of political activities. Following that our main explanatory variable—
memberships in ethnic and German organisations—will be presented.
Political Interest
The first form of political participation presented here is talking about politics,
which we regard as a proxy for political interest. Besides talking about German
politics, we asked respondents how often they talk about politics in their homeland.
We do not present the data on this here, but we will use it later on to explain
political participation regarding Germany.
Table 1 shows that among the ethnic groups, the Italians are most interested in
German and Berlin politics: 62 per cent of them talk almost daily or frequently,
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Table 1 Political interest concerning Germany
Autochthonous Ethnic groups National groups
Germans Turks Italians Russians ItaliansTurks Russians
‘Talking about German politics’ (column %)
Never 16.02.9 13.312.9 10.8 12.2 16.5
Not frequently 20.8 41.2 29.327.6 32.435.1 43.6
Frequently 45.9 38.831.2 39.438.0 38.4 26.1
Almost daily 30.5 18.114.7 12.823.7 14.3 13.8
Total 100.0 100.0100.0 100.0100.0 100.0 100.0
N 279 279 279 279 188188 188
Significance of differences between groups (p-value based on ‘Mann-Whitney U’)
Germans 0.000– 0.0000.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Turks 0.005– 0.156– 0.000 0.266 –
Italians – 0.148– –– 0.009 –
Russians – – –– –– –
Notes: Differences between ethnic and national groups (p-value based on ‘chi-square’): 0.000
(Turks); 0.088 (Italians); 0.295 (Russians).
followed by 53 per cent of the Russians and 45 per cent of the Turks, but the
differences between Russians and Turks do not have a statistically significant
character. If the focus is changed to the national groups, no dramatic changes in
these results can be observed. When immigrants without German citizenship are
excluded, the percentages slightly decrease, but the rank order stays the same: 58 per
cent of the national Italians, 52 per cent of the national Russians and 40 per cent of
the national Turks talk frequently or almost daily about German politics. The
differences between the ethnic and national groups are significant for the Turks and
Italians.4 One observation is unambiguous: compared to the Germans, the political
interest of all ethnic and national groups is significantly lower.
It is not too surprising that Germans are more interested in German politics than
ethnic groups and that the ethnic groups are more interested than the national
groups. However, we still have to investigate if this is a direct effect of the granting
of citizenship or whether there is a sort of latent variable ‘orientation towards
Germany’ lying behind this mechanism. Another question that is still unsolved is
why there are no differences between ethnic Russians (who are mostly Aussiedler)
and national Russians (who are predominantly Jews), taking into account that these
are two rather different groups of which the Aussiedler are presumed to be more
‘German’ in a cultural sense, and are facing a more favourable political opportunity
structure.
Political Activities
A range of activities that people can undertake if they are concerned about the
welfare of their neighbourhood, country, community etc. were included in the
survey. These forms of participation are, formally, open to everyone, and therefore
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Table 2 Political activities concerning Germany
Autochthonous Ethnic groups National groups
Italians RussiansGermans Turks Italians Russians Turks
Types of political activities participated in (% of all)
Money contribution 39.8 22.2 43.141.2 19.114.7 17.6
Meeting 27.2 23.4 17.6 9.3 17.6 16.5 8.0
Collection of signatures 25.4 3.713.3 12.216.5 5.7 10.1
Demonstration 17.6 16.5 20.4 18.15.7 2.713.8
Contact to media 11.8 11.5 14.0 9.3 7.4 13.8 11.2
Contact to politician 10.8 4.39.7 9.610.4 6.5 6.4
Complaint 8.3 5.7 12.29.7 4.33.6 7.4
Strike 2.5 0.54.7 3.23.6 1.8 5.3
188 188N 279 279 279 279 188
Count of political activities (column %)
No activity 37.6 53.0 42.7 72.4 62.2 71.842.0
One activity 25.4 19.4 20.4 13.3 13.8 22.3 14.4
Two activities 14.0 5.910.8 17.016.8 6.5 12.2
Three activities 22.9 16.8 18.620.1 8.07.9 11.7
Total 100.0 100.0100.0 100.0100.0 100.0 100.0
188 188N 279 279 279 279 188
Significance of differences between groups (p-value based on ‘Mann-Whitney U’)
Germans – 0.001 0.356 0.3180.000 0.0000.000
Turks – – 0.014 0.000 – 0.000 0.030
Italians – 0.000– –– 0.000 –
Russians – – – – –– –
Notes: Differences between ethnic and national groups (p-value based on ‘chi-square’): 0.001
(Turks); 0.851(Italians); 0.937 (Russians).
also to people without citizenship rights (Diehl and Blohm 2001). We asked
respondents about their participation in different activities, again both in relation to
issues concerning Berlin and German politics, and separately in relation to their
country of origin. In Table 2 the Germany-related activities are presented.
The rank order regarding the relative popularity of the different forms of activities
is more or less the same for each ethnic group, with monetary contribution at the
top, and participating in strikes at the bottom. The count of political activities
(second section of the table) shows that the Russians, both in ethnic and national
composition, are the group with the lowest level of participation: 72 per cent of them
did not undertake any political activity during the last year. Only about 42 per cent
of the Italians are inactive in the same way. The ethnic and national Turks differ: 53
per cent of the ethnic and 62 per cent of the national Turks were not involved in any
political activity. The differences between all groups are significant, with one
exception: ethnic as well as national Italians seem to participate almost to the same
degree as Germans. Whereas on the criterion of political interest a difference in the
participation pattern between Germans and Italians was found, regarding political
activities we can draw the conclusion that Italians are fully integrated in the German
society, as their participation resembles that of the Germans.
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It is interesting to note that regarding interest Russians score higher than Turks,
but that Turks reverse their position in the rank order when political activities are
concerned. As with political interest, the ethnic and national Turks differ. There
seem to be mechanisms linked with the possession of German nationality which are
especially relevant for the political participation of Turks, but not for the Italians, as
the ethnic and national Italians participate to the same degree. We need to
investigate these mechanisms more fully.
Main Explanatory Variables: Involvement in Voluntary Organisations
Here we will describe our most important explanatory variable, involvement in
voluntary organisation. There exists a whole range of different kinds of voluntary
organisations, and not all of them have the same nature. Some organisations have
purely social aims, like sports and hobby organisations. Others can have social or
political aims, like women’s and youth organisations. Political parties, on the other
hand, have purely political aims. In some cases, participation in voluntary organisa-
tions can therefore overlap with the concept of political participation (questions on
forms of political participation, like participating in strikes or meetings of political
parties). This is rather crucial in our research project because social participation is
used to explain political participation. But it is quite logical that active membership
in a political party leads to participation in political meetings. To say in this case that
participation in organisations leads to political participation comes close to a
tautological argument. Therefore the impacts of political and non-political organisa-
tions on individual political participation were analysed separately.5
Contrary to our expectations, it appeared that people who are active in political
organisations (both ethnic and German) do not tend to be more politically inte-
grated than people who are active in non-political organisations (Berger et al. 2002);
also the intensity of membership participation seems to have no explanatory value.
As the nature of the organisation does not seem to make a substantial difference we
will abandon this distinction and make our analysis in this article based only on the
distinction between ethnic versus non-ethnic organisations. The only exception is
that engagement in German trade unions is treated separately, since earlier research
has shown that this category is interesting to consider separately (Jacobs et al. 2002).
The first section of Table 3 shows the different levels of membership in ethnic and
German voluntary organisations and German trade unions. The ethnic and national
Italians are the most engaged in both German and ethnic organisations. The Turks
show a complex distribution. The ethnic Turks are more engaged in German than
in ethnic organisations, whereas the national group shows the reverse pattern. The
Russians are on both levels more active in ethnic organisations than the Turks,
which is, at least in part, due to the membership of almost all Jews in the Ju¨dische
Gemeinde. But they are also the least active in German organisations, although the
ethnic group is to a substantial part composed by Aussiedler, who are presumed to
be more German than other migrants. Overall (second section of the table), the
Turks and the Russians participate to the same degree in voluntary organisations.
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Vr
ij
e 
Un
iv
er
si
te
it
 A
ms
te
rd
am
] 
At
: 
09
:3
1 
27
 M
ar
ch
 2
01
1
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 499
Table 3 Memberships in ethnic and non-ethnic organisations
Autochthonous Ethnic groups National groups
Italians RussiansGermans Turks Italians Russians Turks
Memberships in ethnic and German voluntary organisations and German trade unions (% of
all)
Ethnic organisations – 30.5 48.0 41.2 34.6 45.7 37.8
German organisations 89.2 24.537.3 53.259.9 31.9 29.3
14.4 2.1German trade unions 33.0 22.2 17.2 1.8 20.2
279 279 188279 188279 188
Memberships in German and ethnic voluntary organisations (column %)
No membership 10.8 31.446.2 52.129.0 48.4 52.7
Member in ethnic 18.1– 23.416.5 15.411.1 19.7
organisations only
Member in German 14.489.2 23.3 36.9 21.5 30.316.5
organisations only
Member in both – 10.114.0 22.922.9 10.4 12.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 279 188279 188279 279 188
Significance of differences between groups (p-value based on ‘chi square’)
Turks – 0.543– 0.0000.000 0.456 –
–Italians 0.000– – – 0.000 –
Russians – – – – – ––
Notes: Differences between ethnic and national groups (p-value based on ‘chi-square’): 0.013
(Turks); 0.049 (Italians); 0.007 (Russians).
About half of these groups are or were never a member of such associations and
there are no significant differences between these groups, neither on the ethnic nor
on the national level. The Italians are most often a member of both an Italian and
a German organisation (23 per cent), followed by the Turks (14 per cent and 13 per
cent) and the Russians (10 per cent). As with political interest and activities, the
national and ethnic Turks differ, which strengthens the idea that it needs to be
further investigated why not having the German nationality seems to be more
important for the Turks than for the other groups.
If we look at the upper section of the table again, we see that the memberships in
trade unions are of a special kind. Ethnic and national Turks are the most engaged
in German trade unions, even more than the Italians. This difference is due to the
historical fact that the Turks came as guestworkers, the Russians as Aussiedler or
Jews. The Turks immigrated in times of full employment when the trade unions had
great political influence. Trade unions were very engaged in questions of equal rights
and anti-discrimination concerning guestworkers. The biggest part of the Russian
immigration took place in the 1990s during times of high unemployment when the
power of trade unions was decreasing. Furthermore, it may be that the Russians
distrust labour organisations, which had an ambiguous character in the communist
states. The Italians are to a considerable part self-employed, so it is not very
surprising that they are less engaged in trade unions.
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A First Attempt to Explain Political Participation
In the foregoing we have explored the political participation of Turks, Italians and
Russians and their participation in both ethnic and non-ethnic organisations. In this
section of the paper we attempt to answer the question as to what extent we can
explain the different kinds of political participation by reference to membership in
ethnic and non-ethnic organisations, and we address the question of how partici-
pation regarding the country of origin relates to this. The first item is the degree of
political interest. We will analyse this in its original composition with four categories
ranging from ‘never talking about politics’ to ‘daily talking about politics’. The
second item is the degree of political activity, measured by the number of different
forms of activity as described in Table 2, ranging from ‘no activity’ to ‘three or more
activities’.
All dependent variables have an ordinal character and should, in our opinion, not
be interpreted as an interval scale because the scales are not divided into intervals of
the same length and they do not approximate a normal distribution. Therefore it was
decided not to use a linear regression technique, but an alternative found in the
family of logistic regression models, the so-called ‘ordinal logit models’. The key
indicator for the effects of the different explanatory variables is standardised ‘odds’.
The statistically correct interpretation of odds is a very abstract undertaking. For our
purposes here it is sufficient to know that values of less than 1 correspond to
negative effects and values greater than 1 to positive effects of the independent
variable. Moreover, the multiplicative distance to 1 is an indicator of the intensity of
the effect. These ordinal logit models are used to compute the correlations between
the two forms of political participation and our explanatory variables.6
Analogous to the other empirical articles in this JEMS special issue (the following
three papers), the independent variables will be added to the model in four steps. In
a first step of the analysis the independent variables gender, education (based on a
score of estimated years that are necessary to reach different educational degrees)
and language proficiency (five categories ranging from ‘no German’ to ‘German is
mother tongue’) are introduced. In a second step the occupational status (occupied
and unemployed in relation to not being active in the labour market) is added. In
the third step we come to our main explanatory variable, membership in ethnic
voluntary organisations (coded as a dummy). The cross-ethnic counterparts of this
variable—membership in German voluntary organisations and membership in
German trade unions—are added in the fourth step.
In addition to these comparable steps we introduced one more variable in a fifth
model, namely homeland-orientated participation. This last point is very important
in order to get pure effects of ethnic communities on political participation.
Remember what a multivariate analysis is able to perform: the estimated effects—
here presented by standardised odds—inform us about the impact of an indepen-
dent variable controlled for the effects of all other independent variables in the
model. The most interesting variable according to the theoretical framework is
membership in ethnic organisations. When political interest concerning Germany is
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the dependent variable and political interest concerning the country of origin is
added to the model as one of the independent variables, one controls for a latent
background variable, which can be described as ‘general political interest’.7 So the
effect of memberships in ethnic organisations on German political interest is
adjusted for this global relationship and enables the model to answer the following
question: What is the correlation between memberships in ethnic organisations and
the exclusive political interest concerning Germany when the general political
interest is equal for all respondents?
After this excursion into the methodological and theoretical background of our
analytical strategy, we now come to the analysis itself. We present two tables, one
explaining German political interest (Table 4) and one explaining German political
activities (Table 5), for ethnic groups as well as for national groups.
Model 1 of Table 4 shows that gender (being a female) has a negative impact on
political interest for the Turks, especially for the national Turks. Education is of high
significance for all groups, and it stays significant when other variables are added to
the model. Language proficiency has a somewhat smaller impact, but—opposite to
education—its impact increases when more variables are added. In model 2 the
occupational status was included, but this made no contribution to the explanatory
power of the different models. Likewise, adding memberships in ethnic organisations
does not increase the explanatory power of the model (model 3). So it seems that
membership in ethnic organisations has no impact, either positive or negative, on
the German political interest of all ethnic groups. In model 4 we added memberships
in German organisations and trade unions. Here we see that for the Turks member-
ship in trade unions and for Italians membership in German organisations correlate
significantly with political interest concerning Germany. For the Russians neither
membership in trade unions nor in German organisations influence their political
interest.
The explanation of political interest in Germany is not very satisfying taking the
information derived from models 1 to 4 together. The explained variances are low
(under 20 per cent). This changes dramatically if we look at model 5, where we added
the variable political interest concerning the country of origin. In this model the
explained variances for all groups rise dramatically. Migrants interested in homeland
politics are much more interested in German politics than migrants who never or
seldom talk about politics in respectively Turkey, Italy or Russia. This is the case for
all groups with the most extreme value for the national Russians. It is also interesting
to observe that the impact of ethnic memberships becomes negative for Turks and
Italians when their homeland interest is controlled for. So we have to adjust the
former statement that ethnic membership is irrelevant for political interest in
Germany. There exists indeed a tendency for ethnic membership to correlate
negatively with political interest. Although this correlation is not significant we
cannot disregard it because this tendency is the same for Turks and Italians. It only
needs a larger sample for these effects to become significant. This substantiates our
argument that it is necessary to control for the latent background variable ‘general
political interest’. So one can conclude that when two migrants are politically
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interested to the same degree, the one who is a member of an ethnic organisation
will be less interested in political issues referring specifically to Germany.
Table 5 presents models regarding the explanation of German political activities.
The first model shows that the overall effects of gender, education and language
proficiency are lower than in the analogous models for the explanation of political
interest; only language proficiency for Turks and education for Italians are
significant. Employment status (model 2) has no significant impact on political
activities.
But one can observe meaningful differences from the political interest explana-
tions when memberships in ethnic organisations are introduced (model 3): highly
significant effects appear for all groups. These effects remain stable when member-
ships in German organisations are controlled for (model 4), which are also of higher
importance than in the models explaining political interest. But the effects of
German membership are smaller than the effects of ethnic membership.
But these effects, especially of ethnic organisations, decrease when political activity
concerning the homeland is added in model 5. Once more the impact of the
homeland-directed counterpart has the absolutely strongest explanatory power for
all groups. As with the models regarding political interest, only the input of this
variable leads to a satisfactory explanatory model. As in the models explaining
political interest, the explained variance is lowest for the Russians and highest for the
Turks. It seems that our explanatory models ‘fit’ the Turks better than the Russians.
Conclusions
Looking back at the descriptive data, we conclude that there are some substantial
differences in the political participation patterns of Italians, Turks and Russians and
in the way they relate to the German patterns. Italians resemble the Germans the
most, especially regarding political activities, and participate always more than
Russians and Turks, of whom Turks participate more in German political activities
and Russians talk more about German politics. But only for the Turks does it seem
to be of importance whether or not they have German nationality. Surprisingly this
does not hold for the Russians, where the Aussiedler, who encounter in Berlin
relatively favourable opportunities, dominate the ethnic category because of their
German nationality. The fact that the data show that Italians participate more than
Turks is not so stunning, as the opportunities, both political and in the public
discourse, are more favourable towards Italians than towards Turks.
The assumption that ethnic political participation of migrants is a threat to their
political integration in Berlin and German society does not seem to be confirmed by
the data presented in this article. Participation, both political interest and political
activities, towards the country of origin is the most powerful variable in our models
for explaining political participation in Berlin and German politics. The fears of the
assimilationists therefore seem to lack an empirical basis, as political participation
regarding Germany and the country of origin seem to be country-neutral, and
influenced by a latent variable—‘general political interest’. However, on the aggre-
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gate level (the participation scores of the different ethnic groups), the positive
relation between German-oriented participation and homeland participation cannot
be found. The Turks are the most homeland-oriented and the least Germany-
oriented, both regarding their political and social orientation; this is exactly the other
way around for the Italians, who are the most German-oriented and the least
homeland-oriented. For the Russians this picture is somewhat ambiguous, probably
due to the recent immigration of this group.
Whereas on a general level our data provide support for the mutual reinforcement
of ethnic and non-ethnic political participation, support for the more specific
arguments of theories of social capital was more ambiguous. Both participation in
ethnic and German organisations correlates positively with German political activi-
ties, irrespective of whether the organisation has a political or a non-political nature.
This means that a person who is involved in a German or ethnic organisation is
more likely to participate in German political issues. On the other hand, for the
variable of political interest we found some indications that went in the opposite
direction, namely that involvement in ethnic associations may be detrimental to
interest in Berlin and German politics. People involved in ethnic organisations
tended to be more interested in homeland politics and less interested in German
politics.
How can we explain this paradoxical fact that ethnic civil society contributes to
political activities with regard to Germany, but not to an interest in German politics?
The question on political participation was asked twice, once homeland-related and
once related to Germany. But this latter form of participation can in itself also have
two orientations. It can be oriented around general German issues, like unemploy-
ment or the foreign politics of the German government, but also focused on the
ethnic group in Germany, like integration politics or the right to Islamic education.
Thus it could be that ethnic organisations do succeed in getting their members
mobilised on migrant themes, but not in getting them interested in German politics
in general. We must also bear in mind here that the wording of the question on
activities differs from the wording of the question on interest. Where the word
‘politics’ was explicitly used in the latter, for the question on activities we described
politics more implicitly as ‘bring about improvements or counteract deterioration in
society’. Therefore it is possible that respondents who were interested in the latter
type of ‘low’ politics, answered in the negative on the question on political interest,
which refers to a more abstract level. Anyway, we can state with certainty that
political interest and political activities are two separate elements of political
integration and that the underlying social capital mechanisms function differently.
This conclusion is also strengthened by the fact that the socio-demographic variables
(language, education) are of more importance for explaining interest than for
activities.
We can conclude that ethnic and German political participation, both measured
as activities and interest, are not mutually exclusive at the individual level. But on
an aggregate level, the group with the highest amount of homeland-directed orien-
tation, the Turks, is not the group with the highest orientation towards the politics
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of Germany, and vice versa. The social capital hypothesis that membership in
voluntary organisations contributes to political participation is confirmed entirely
for political activities, and partly for political interest. Also the cross-cultural effects
are ambiguous, as membership in ethnic organisations contributes to activities but
tends to affect interest negatively. To investigate the mechanisms that underlie these
results, in future work we will expand our scope to the aggregate level and investigate
the organisational structure of the ethnic communities and see if the density, quality
and functioning of the networks can help us solve the questions that are still open.
By doing so we hopefully can also answer the question as to why our models do a
better job in predicting the political participation of Turks and Italians than the
political participation of Russians.
Notes
[1] In a recent study of protest activities in the Federal Republic of Germany since 1950, Rucht
(2001) reports that the issue-area of immigration, ethnic relations and xenophobia has in
the 1990s become the single most important topic of protest. This includes racist attacks
and antiracist demonstrations, but also a sizeable share of mobilisation by migrants
themselves.
[2] One exception was made with respect to the immigrants from the former Soviet Union: the
so-called Aussiedler and the Jewish ‘refugees’. By communicating with the responsible
authorities for the admission of both groups in Berlin, it could be detected that a
proportion of the ethnic Germans as well as the Jews, have names which are not descended
from Russian, but are typically German or Jewish. Therefore we had to test whether
Aussiedler and Jews with Russian names differed from those with German names. To test
this a further sample of Russian migrants was drawn, which was based on specific German
and Jewish names. However, it turned out that there were no significant differences between
the Aussiedler from the Russian and the German lists of names, and neither between the
Jews from the two lists.
[3] By ‘Mann-Whitney U’ the null hypothesis that two random samples derive from uniformly
distributed populations having identical means is tested. The test is based on rank sums of
deviations from the median (and not the arithmetic mean). This procedure is suitable when
the variable under investigation has an ordinal character as is the case for political interest
and political activity. The p-value represents the probability of making an error in accepting
the alternative hypothesis that the samples are drawn from different populations.
[4] We tested the differences between ethnic and national groups by the underlying assumption
that the distributions of the ethnic groups are representative of the whole population. Then
we examined the deviations of the national groups using ‘chi square’. This procedure has
the disadvantage that we cannot use the ordinal information of the dependent variable, but
unfortunately we did not find a procedure analogous to ‘Mann-Whitney U’, testing two
populations sharing a part of their members. The p-value represents the probability of
making an error when accepting the alternative hypothesis that the national group derives
from a different population.
[5] In the category ‘political’ the following organisations were included: citizens’ initiatives,
political parties, socio-political organisations (e.g. Greenpeace) and special-interest organi-
sations. As non-political we included sports clubs, leisure organisations, cultural organisa-
tions, self-help groups, welfare organisations, women’s organisations, youth organisations,
religious organisations and ethnic/national organisations.
[6] Ordinal logit models are part of the family of logistic regression models. The basic model
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of logistic regression, the binary logit model, is used when the dependent variable is
dichotomous. In ordinal logit models the categories of the dependent variable are aggre-
gated to dichotomous variables where higher-ranked categories are contrasted with lower-
ranked categories. The coefficients for all binary logit models are aggregated to one
coefficient.
[7] From earlier analyses we know that there is a strong correlation between political interest
concerning the country of origin and German political interest. The same applies to political
activities. This indicates that there exists a latent background variable, that is country-
neutral.
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